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Abstract
This exploratory work seeks to shed light on disaster governance by looking into potential linkages between the produc-
tion of vulnerability and disaster governance in Chile. Our point of investigation is the case of post-disaster Chaitén and
the Chilean model of Disaster Risk Management. The work begins by situating disaster governance and the production of
vulnerability in a broader context of existing governance system that includes a multiplicity of actors and socio-economic,
socio-ecological, and political processes. Coming from amulti-scalar perspective, we use the disaster Pressure and Release
(PAR) model to enable a differentiated analysis of the multiplicity of actors, rules, and processes related to DRM that par-
ticipate in the production of disaster vulnerability in the current Chaitén. With this we address the questions as to ‘why’
the Chilean model of DRM is prominently centralised and ‘what’ are the effects on the production of disaster vulnerability
for the case of post-disaster Chaitén.
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1. Introduction
This exploratory work seeks to look into potential link-
ages between disaster governance and the production
of vulnerability in order to shed light on disaster gover-
nance in Chile. Our point of investigation is the case of
post-disaster Chaitén and the Disaster Risk Management
(DRM) in Chile. Firstly, we offer some key definitions
on disaster governance and vulnerability that underpin
the exploration of potential linkages between these two
processes. Secondly, we map different laws, institutions,
and Territorial Planning Instruments (TPIs) to offer an
overview on the model of DRM in Chile, which is char-
acterised by its high centralisation, top-down approach,
and reactive and post-event orientation. The character-
isation of the DRM in Chile informs our analysis of the
case of post-disaster Chaitén, a remote port-city in South-
ern Chile that was affected by a volcano eruption in 2008.
Post-disaster Chaitén is examined fromamulti-scalar per-
spective where underlying causes of disaster vulnerabil-
ity in the actual city can be associated with bad disaster
governance, especially regarding how policy response
and decision-making were applied between 2008 and
2013. Someof the post-disaster processes in Chaitén that
inform our exploration are the evacuation, subsidies and
benefits schemes, as well as other recovery strategies
such as the Chaitén Law and the New Chaitén project.
We believe that this case is compelling because it works
as a proxy to discuss how governance processes during
post-disaster phases are able to influence future disaster
vulnerability.
In adopting a perspective of scale, we utilise the
disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model to enable a
differentiated analysis of the horizontal and vertical ar-
rangements that participate in the production of disaster
vulnerability in the current Chaitén, and through which
we address the questions: ‘why’ the Chilean model of
DRM is prominently centralised and ‘what’ are the ef-
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fects on the production of disaster vulnerability for the
case of post-disaster Chaitén. In the final section, we
offer some reflections on how some unsafe conditions
such as the ‘erosion of trust in authorities’ in Chaitén can
be linked to decision-making and policies (dynamic pres-
sures) and political centralising forces (root causes) as ap-
plied by temporally and spatially distant actors. We ar-
gue that during the progression of vulnerability, the mul-
tiplicity of actors, rules, and processes related to DRM at
different geographical and social scales are extremely im-
portant and themselves reveal the grave significance of
disaster governance. In order to best present the case of
the DRM in Chile and Chaitén supporting this work in the
next sections, the clarification of key concepts is in order.
With the term disaster governance we refer to the
set of interrelated regulatory frameworks and norms, or-
ganisations, institutions, and practices within the disas-
ter cycle (i.e. disaster response, recovery, reconstruction,
mitigation, and preparedness) that are organised at mul-
tiple social and geographical scales to anticipate, cope
with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or
human-made hazard (Gall, Cutter, & Nguyen, 2014; Tier-
ney, 2012). Disaster governance encompasses organisa-
tional and institutional actors from formal governments,
private companies, and civil society bodies, to informal
organisations such as networks and elites. The relation-
ships between sets of rules, actors, and organisations can
be configured in horizontal and vertical governance ar-
rangements (Renn, 2008).
Disaster governance has an important influence on
the production and prevention of the growth of vulnera-
bility, and ultimately for the reduction of disaster risks.
In simple terms, disaster risk means the possibility of
negative effects in the future. That possibility solely sur-
faces from the interaction of human and natural envi-
ronments. However, generations of socio-scientific dis-
aster researchers have argued that ‘hazards’ are not the
sole driver of risk and disaster losses, rather that levels of
possible negative effects as well as disaster losses are in
good part determined by the vulnerability and exposure
of people and socio-ecological systems (e.g. Cardona et
al., 2012; Voss, 2008). Thus, it is a purely societal or cul-
tural failure to experience horrific disasters like in Haiti
2010 or in Japan in 2011 and not wholly from nature nor
from anything else external to the social. Instead, one
should place the blame primarily on (bad) governance.
Disaster governance and vulnerability are intrinsi-
cally connected through the entanglement of actors and
dynamic processes that support and facilitate the pro-
duction of disasters risks. Whilst disaster governance on
the one hand refers to the complexity of multiple ele-
ments that are relevant within the never-ending disas-
ter cycle, socio-ecological and political economy perspec-
tives tell us that such ‘web’ of disaster governance can ex-
plain both the production and reduction of vulnerability,
risks, and disasters on the other.
An expanded perspective on disaster vulnerability
akin to that which is elaborated on in this work, is found
in the Pressure and Release (PAR) model (Wisner, Blaikie,
Cannon, & Davis, 2004). In it, vulnerability production
is modelled by a sequence of social, economic, and po-
litical forces at different times in a process called the
‘progression of vulnerability’. According to the authors of
the model, disaster vulnerability consists of the circum-
stances and characteristics of an element of interest (i.e.
community, system, or asset) that influence said commu-
nity’s capacity to anticipate, copewith, resist and recover
from the negative impacts of a natural or human-made
extreme event, and likewise make the community sus-
ceptible to be affected in a severe manner (Wisner et al.,
2004). Moreover, the PAR model offers a chain of cau-
sation to interpret disaster responsibilities. As displayed
in Figure 1, the social production of disaster vulnerabil-
ity is based on the idea that a more precise explanation
of disasters requires us to backtrack the social relations
between the impacts of a hazard on a community and a
series of structural factors and processes that facilitate
its production (Wisner et al., 2004).
Although the PAR model does not explicitly elabo-
rate it, it does touch upon the multi-scalar dimension
of the progression of vulnerability, sketching it as a hi-
erarchically organised process that takes place in differ-
entiated spaces and time. The scalar organisation of the
progression of vulnerability therefore has implications
for governance. For instance, when viewing the histori-
cal evolution of the state territorial organisation of Chile
(i.e. from federalist to centralising models, Montecinos,
2005) we can observe how this, as a ‘root cause’ process,
has enabled and facilitated the centralisation of decision-
making within the domains of DRM and Disaster Risk Re-
duction (DRR). We can likewise observe how that ulti-
mately has resulted in forms of ‘unsafe conditions’ for
the people that live distant from political and economic
centres, such as for the case of post-disaster Chaitén.
In terms of methodology, we adopt a disaster vulner-
ability framework as it allows us to look at the structural
factors of risks and disasters, associated often to gover-
nance, politics, and economic issues. Although we agree
Root
causes
Dynamic
pressures
The progression of vulnerability
Unsafe
condions
1 2 3
HazardsR = V × H
Disaster
Figure 1. The disaster Pressure and Release (PAR) model.
Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 107–116 108
on the necessity of other studies on resilience and haz-
ards, in our view, the problematique of disasters (i.e. its
theoretical and practical conceptualisation, its causality
debate, and its factual reduction) cannot be thoroughly
understood by means of only such studies. If we are to
further understand the causes of disasters, we cannot af-
ford to neglect investigations into the principles that ‘gov-
ern’ their intensity and nature, which themselves are in
fact more grounded in the social rather than the natural
world. In thismanner, thiswork situates itself in a political
economy perspective of disasters through its application
of the PAR model as the selected analytical framework in
addition to other diverse qualitative research techniques.
Principal among these chosen techniques was a policy
and documentary analysis supported by in-depth and
guided interviewing. As part of a doctoral thesis, one of
the authors conducted fieldworks in Chile—including San-
tiago, Puerto Montt, and Chaitén—between March and
September 2013, and in late-2014, to investigate the pro-
gression of vulnerability in post-disaster Chaitén. In the
analysis of vulnerability drivers, the role of disaster gov-
ernance emerged clearly as an influential factor. The in-
stitutional analysis draws upon the review of more than
60 documents: laws, regulatory frameworks, TPIs, insti-
tutional reports, policy papers, press release, and me-
dia archives. The documents which were selected and
analysed come from (listed from the micro to macro lev-
els): Municipality of Chaitén, Provincial Government of
Palena, provincial offices of ministerial representations
for Housing, Finance, Public Works, Health, Economy
Development, Social Development, Agriculture, and Na-
tional Property, Fire Brigade, the Government of Los La-
gos Region (LLR), and the National Subsecretariat for Re-
gional Development and Administration (SUBDERE), Na-
tional Office of Emergency of the Ministry of Interior
(ONEMI), Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Housing
and Urbanism (MINVU), National Institute of Statistics
(INE), National Congress Library (e.g. Chaitén Law), uni-
versities, among others. These documents help us to un-
derstand the geographical distribution and hierarchical
organisation of DRM and DRR in Chile as well as its reper-
cussions on policy response and decision-making for the
case of post-disaster Chaitén. In order to find conver-
gence and corroboration, this analysis was then comple-
mented with interviews conducted among the aforemen-
tioned institutions and with Chaitén people and commu-
nity organisations. 66 interviewees were selected in to-
tal and they were approached differently using a snow-
ball sampling technique which was also informed by insti-
tutional reports in several cases. Since the research was
inductive in nature, the questions spanned and evolved
from micro to macro levels. We began with ‘local’ ques-
tions that helped to identify some unsafe conditions (e.g.
erosion of trust in authorities) for Chaitén city and its pop-
ulation and rounded off with questions concerning the
dynamic pressures and root causes of such conditions for
interviewees at regional and national levels (e.g. howwas
the New Chaitén project planned?).
2. Disaster Governance in Chile
Chile developed disaster risk management institutions,
legislations, and policies relatively early, perhaps be-
cause of its history of disasters. For instance, the 1928
Talca earthquake impressed upon authorities andworker
unions to implement disaster risk reduction (DRR) mea-
sures (e.g. the identification of disaster-prone areas)
within the General Law of Construction andUrbanisation
(Presidencia de la Republica de Chile, 1936). In 1939, the
Chillán earthquake provided the basis for earthquake-
resistant construction standards named the Chilean Stan-
dard for Seismic Design of Buildings Nº 429 (NCh429).
The 1960 Valdivia earthquake and the 1965 La Ligua
earthquake prompted a debate about a better coor-
dination between actors involved in disaster response
(firefighters, police, army), relief (Chilean Red Cross),
preparedness and planning (Government institutions),
that concluded with the creation of the ONEMI in 1974
(ONEMI, 2014).
Today, the constellation of laws, institutions, and
other related regulatory frameworks informing DRM is
vast and diverse in Chile. Figure 2 maps a number of
analysed regulations and bodies that deal with the dis-
aster management cycle and can influence disaster gov-
ernance. In the figure, they are organised according to
their nature into three differentiated categories and sub-
categories: system of rules (juridical and regulations), in-
stitutions, and TPIs. Moreover, these categories are ar-
ranged in a Cartesian layout to distinguish the character
of the element involved, according to its orientation to-
wards ‘pre-event’ or ‘post-event’ disaster. Likewise, they
are divided into groupingswhether they aremore nation-
ally or regional and locally orientated.
The ONEMI takes its place at the centre of the di-
agram as the primary technical agency of the state re-
sponsible for coordinating the National Civil Protection
System (SNPC). The ONEMI’s mission is to plan, promote,
coordinate, and implement preventive actions, response,
and rehabilitation against collective risk situations, emer-
gencies, and disasters caused by natural or human action
(ONEMI, 2014).
According to the guidelines of the ONEMI, each ad-
ministrative level (i.e. regional, provincial, and commu-
nal) must have a Civil Protection Committee (CPC). Each
CPC must internally elaborate a ‘plan’ to implement pre-
vention, mitigation and preparedness actions in relation
to DRM and DRR. CPCs are composed of representa-
tives from public and private agencies and their struc-
ture varies according to the territorial level they repre-
sent. In some localities such as Chaitén that are com-
monly isolated and furnished with restricted financial re-
sources and limited access to power, CPCs hardly meet
and ‘design’ or ‘implement’ DRR strategies. Moreover,
the ONEMI’s policy establishes that the executional costs
are to be covered by each of the ministries, agencies, in-
tendant administrations, regional governments, and mu-
nicipalities with its own resources (Ministerio del Interior
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Figure 2.Map of the institutional forms related with DRM cycle in Chile.
y Seguridad Pública, 2002), thus liberating the responsi-
bility of prioritising DRR to the respective local levels and
having it compete with other specifically local demands
and realities.
Despite the declaration of the ONEMI regarding ‘pre-
paredness’ and ‘mitigation’, the office focuses mainly on
‘emergency management’ and response. The first indica-
tion of the latter is the level of attention paid to ‘emer-
gency issues’ rather than to ‘prevention’ and ‘prepared-
ness’. A quick textual analysis of the SupremeDecree (DS)
Nº 156 shows that the word ‘emergency’ is used twice as
often in comparison to the phrases ‘risk reduction’, ‘pre-
vention’ and ‘preparedness’ all together (Ministerio del
Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2002).
During emergency periods, the ONEMI are config-
ured by Emergency Operations Centres (COEs). These
centres are organised at each level of the political-
administrative order and they are responsible for deci-
sions and actions coordinated to response and rehabili-
tation. COEs are headed by representatives of territorial
governments that are part of the CPCs; the President of
the Republic and Minister of Interior, Intendant, Gover-
nor, and Mayor respectively (see Figure 3).
The figure above reflects the hierarchical organisa-
tion of the decision-making process within the ONEMI.
Officially, the command hierarchy in the decision-making
process within the ONEMI is at first ‘political’ in nature,
then ‘administrative’, and lastly ‘technical’ (Ministerio
del Interior y Seguridad Pública, 2013)1.
Apart from other individual analyses of the elements
displayed in Figure 2 and 3, our intention is to map these
laws, institutions, and plans to shed light on the central-
isation of DRM in Chile, and highlighting its top-down
approach as well as its reactive, post-event orientation
(Sandoval, González-Muzzio, Wagemann, Mena, & Ejs-
mentewicz, 2015). The question as to ‘why’ the Chilean
model of DRM is prominently centralised and ‘what’ ef-
fects this centralisation has on the production of disaster
vulnerability will be addressed in the following sections.
2.1. Centralisation of the DRM in Chile
A centralised model of DRM will influence the way in
which disaster governance operates. Structural factors
in national politics and economy affect the system of
rules (Mitnick, 1980) from which the actors, institutions,
and people participate in the disaster governance pro-
cess. A reason why the model of DRM in Chile is highly
centralised can be found in the idea that government’s
institutions tend to mirror or reproduce the state terri-
1 The referential document was obtained via the Transparency Law and is not available to general public.
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torial organisation of countries (Brenner, 2000). As we
have discovered, it is then not surprising that disaster
related institutions assimilate the structure, hierarchical
organisation, and spatial distribution of the state terri-
torial organisation in a country politically and economi-
cally centralised like Chile: that is, the way in which the
territory is spatially organised to be administrated by
the government.
In a historical review of the state territorial organisa-
tion of Chile, Montecinos (2005) examined how the var-
ious geo-political scales of the national, regional, provin-
cial, and communal have evolved since its independence
from the Spanish Empire in 1810 up until in the twenty-
first century. In the timeline story of the resulting state
territorial organisation, mainly referred to the political
administration of the state and the economy (i.e. mode
of production, structures of domination, and other social
relations), one is able to distinguish a dialectical pattern
involving decentralisation and regionalist tensions.
Chile’s latest significant territorial reorganisation oc-
curred in 1973, months after the coup d’état led by
the General Augusto Pinochet against the democratically
elected president Salvador Allende. The territorial reor-
ganisation was based on a mode of economic poles of
development characterised by the designation of ‘cen-
tral spatial units’ determined by a city as a hub that
were to connect the rest of the region. Santiago and the
Metropolitan Area were established as the main centre
of national development, whilst the three poles of multi-
regional development were Antofagasta, Valparaíso, and
Concepción (Boisier, 2000). A ‘third level of hierarchy’
was composed by another set of ‘sub-poles of regional
development’ which were first politically and then eco-
nomically subordinated to the aforementioned regional
poles (Montecinos, 2005).
On a general level, it seems that the state terri-
torial organisation has an important influence on the
geographical and scalar organisation of DRM and DRR
in Chile. This is the case as other institutional forms
such as in education (e.g. ministries, regional depart-
ments, schools, and so forth) are often geographically
distributed and hierarchically organised in concordance
with the state territorial organisation (Clark, 2014)—e.g.
centralist, federalist, among others. As displayed in Fig-
ure 2 and 3, the DRM in Chile evidences the apparent
centralised and top–down approaches as inherited from
those approaches that dominate the actual state territo-
rial organisation. Again, our emphasis is to examine ‘cen-
tralisation’ as a ‘root cause’ or underlying factor that facil-
itates the production of vulnerability in the case of post-
disaster Chaitén.
From this point, we can nowmove on to trying to un-
derstand ‘what’ effects (i.e. unsafe conditions) the char-
acteristics of such set of rules and institutions have on
the production of disaster vulnerability. Upon this deduc-
tion, we will then present some reflections on disaster
governance. To do so, we review the case of post-disaster
Chaitén to explore disaster governance with a specific
look into decision-making, community resistance, and
other local-related processes that lead the production of
vulnerability.
2.2. The Case of Post-Disaster Chaitén
Chaitén is a remote southern city in Los Lagos Region,
Chile, residing about 1,000km away from Santiago, the
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nation’s capital. Chaitén was severely affected by a vol-
canic eruption inMay 2008 at a timewhen roughly 8,000
people lived in the commune. Althoughno fatalitieswere
registered, media and authorities labelled the event a
‘disaster’ due to its significant economic and social costs.
The time span of our analysis encompasses post-disaster
events from May 2008 to late 2014 (see Figure 4).
It all began with tremors felt by Chaiteninos (as peo-
ple from Chaitén call themselves) the night of 30th April
2008. During the following 24 hours, regional and lo-
cal authorities, and specialists met people in Chaitén ex-
plaining to them that the shakeswere probably the result
of ‘tectonic movements’. According to community lead-
ers that attended those meetings:
“These meetings were very strange because from the
beginning they [authorities] said that is ‘only seis-
mic’ activity without risks, they explained us about
the ‘tectonic’ movements. But in reality they had
no idea…because there was an eruption the days af-
ter these meetings.” (Pablo, Community leader, inter-
viewed in July 2013)2
Effectively, a day after, on 1st May at 23:38 these quakes
culminated in a violent eruption. The first official state-
ment asserted that the eruption could be attributed to
the Michimauida volcano. However, flyovers during the
next morning confirmed that the rash of activity corre-
sponded to an unknown volcano,whichwas immediately
named ‘Chaitén’, about 10km north of the city. Due to
the high probability of lahars andmudflows from the vol-
cano, the ONEMI in Santiago declared ‘Red Alert’ to im-
mediately initiate the evacuation of the entire city on 2nd
May. Between 2nd and 4th May, 8,119 people were evac-
uated to surrounding locations within Los Lagos Region,
mainly by sea routes using private andChileanNavy ships.
According to interviewed local leaders who participated
in the evacuation, there were two negative and still con-
flicting issues regarding the evacuation: families were
split, women and children were evacuated first, followed
by men. Chaiteninos were unable to know where their
family members were, neither being able to communi-
cate to one another during the first days. Destinations
of evacuated people were not pre-established, nor was
there a plan to act during the evacuation. The sole ob-
jective was to preserve life and secure basic subsistence
(Sandoval, Boano, González-Muzzio, & Albornoz, 2015).
The second issue was that people were told that the
evacuation would last a maximum of two weeks, after
which they supposedly could return to the city for their
belongings and valuables. That never happened because
national authorities later on decided to ban Chaitén
from being inhabited for at least two years. According to
Marcela, a local leader interviewed in July 2013: ‘We lost
all our personal belongings [referring to pictures, mem-
ories, personal valuables] because they told us that we
will come back in fewweeks…many left their animals and
pets, they all died because we trust we could came back’.
This discourse is often found in similar forms in other in-
terviews, where the feeling of ‘abandonment’ and ‘dis-
tance’ from authorities was starting to take shape. The
‘interpretation of the tremors’ by authorities and special-
ists and the way the evacuation was conducted are con-
flicting issues for the Chaiteninos because these still per-
sist in their memory and exist as a powerful reminder to
not fully believe in authorities in the future. This erodes
people’s trust in the government: ‘In case of a new evac-
uation I will stand firm here, I will not leave my land, my
house, my assets…I do not let them take me nowhere…I
prefer to die here than to live howwe lived during the our
time in PuertoMontt [city where shewas evacuatedwith
her family]’, (Roberta, Community leader, interviewed in
July 2013). Such discourse, however, does not limit itself
to the experience with the first days of the emergency.
The process of recovery was activated by national and
regional authorities shortly after the people were evac-
2 Names used are fictional in order to protect interviewees privacy, although gender and position or job are provided.
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uated. Several government agencies allocated special re-
sources to support and compensate Chaitén families dur-
ing the relocation processes. The main measure imple-
mented was the ‘Chaitén Emergency Subsidy’. This sub-
sidy encompassed amonthly payment of up toUS$ 1,000
per family and it was delivered between May 2008 and
October 2010. During the first year,more than 3,200 fam-
ilies benefited from it, and about 1,800 families in the
second and third year. Another important compensatory
measure utilised were housing subsidies. 2,235 families
received a one-off housing subsidy of about US$ 20,000
each (Gobierno Regional de Los Lagos, 2009). The sub-
sidy offered special financial support to displaced peo-
ple from Chaitén to resettle them in other cities such as
Castro, Puerto Montt, and Puerto Varas. In some places,
such as in Puerto Varas, a new ‘neighbourhood’ was con-
structed (MINVU, 2008). Likewise, other subsidies for
entrepreneurship and psychological support were given
(Gobierno Regional de Los Lagos, 2009; Presidencia de
la República de Chile & Narváez, 2009). As a part of the
national government’s strategy to encourage people to
leave Chaitén definitively, the LawNº 20,385was promul-
gated (also called the ‘Chaitén Law’). The ‘Chaitén Law’ al-
lowed the state to purchase properties paying for them
their market price prior the eruption. According to ex-
perts and local authorities, this strategy’s objective was
twofold: first, to restrict the habitability and occupancy
of Chaitén because of its high risk, and second, to com-
pensate the losses of the affected population by transfer-
ring more financial resources to them. Once the Chaitén
Lawwas approved in October 2009, the state bought 889
properties for a total of US$ 30 million—more than 80%
of the total property in Chaitén (Senado de la República
de Chile, 2013).
Subsidies, benefits, and other compensatory mea-
sures aimed to reduce suffering and give more oppor-
tunities to the affected people. Nevertheless, the lack
of control and supervision over the benefits may have
produced other undesirable effects and perhaps con-
tributed to the production of unsafe conditions in the
current Chaitén. One unforeseen effect of such subsi-
dies may be the production of a kind of ‘welfare de-
pendency’: ‘People were reliant on government bene-
fits for more than two years….I know some of them
did not receive any other income…when those [bene-
fits] ended up, they found themselves with no savings
and debts…eventually, these people returned to Chaitén
despite the ban’ (Rosa, Local government official, inter-
viewed in September 2013). Although ‘welfare depen-
dency’ is difficult to trace in this case, a dominant narra-
tive among specialists in Chaitén points out that debt and
economic constraints (derived from mismanagement of
recovery resources) were common among Chaiteninos
that decided to return the city since 2010.
Next to the on-going recovery, other important pro-
cesses were taking shape such as the relocation of the
city itself with a project named ‘New Chaitén’. Techni-
cal and planning reports supported the idea of relocating
the entire city to Santa Barbara—50km north of Chaitén
(Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile [PUC], 2009).
Evacuated people were consulted, a master plan was de-
vised, and housing designs were tendered between 2009
and 2010 (MINVU, 2010). There were even some build-
ings constructed for the Police and Navy in Santa Bar-
bara, but the New Chaitén project was finally aborted in
December 2010 by the then recently elected President
Sebastian Piñera in opposition to the previous President
Bachelet’s plans. This situation further frustrated Chait-
eninos’ trust in authorities.
Another important process was that by late 2010,
around 1,000 to 1,500 people had in fact returned to
Chaitén despite the ban on inhabiting the city. The ini-
tial group was named ‘the rebels’ (Rojas, 2013) by the
media. They were well organised (they even had a radio
station with which encouraged other Chaiteninos to re-
turn to the city) and fought for their ‘right’ to stay in the
city; ‘it was a tremendous struggle against government’s
intentions to relocate us definitively…we stayed firm and
strong because Chaitén has always been our land, we
did not want to live anywhere else’ (María, Commu-
nity leader, interviewed in July 2013). The rebels demon-
strated several times in Santiago, Puerto Montt (the re-
gional capital), and Chaitén, gaining support from me-
dia and politicians. Thus, political shifts, community re-
sistance, a lack of supervision on delivering benefits, the
slowness and the high costs of the New Chaitén project
estimated at US$ 300 million (Silva, 2010), were some of
the reasons which compounded and led to the govern-
ment announcing the lift of the banon inhabiting Chaitén
in December 2010.
This decision, nevertheless, triggered some other un-
foreseen effects. First, it included only the North sector
of Chaitén, keeping the South firmly excluded for habita-
tion. With limited land in the North—where about 2,500
people live—and a lack of investment for expanding the
housingmarket, today there are about 200 families infor-
mally inhabiting South Chaitén. Implications for living in
the South sector are not negative per se, however, when
one considers Chaitén (North and South sectors) as an
entire community (as the Chaitén people do), the South
sector’s people found themselves comparatively help-
less against future extreme events. Whilst the North sec-
tor has somehow ‘resurrected’ by attracting private in-
vestment and government’s support in terms of schools
and hospitals, also generating income opportunities for
the people, and securing civil protection through mitiga-
tory measures such as the flood barrier for the Blanco
River’s north bank, the South sector lacks all of these ser-
vices and opportunities (Sandoval, Gonzalez-Muzzio, &
Albornoz, 2014).
3. Final Reflections
The post-disaster processes reviewed in the case of
Chaitén indubitably occurred within a disaster gover-
nance structure. The architecture of rules, actors, and
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processes that constitute disaster risk management in
Chile facilitates and limits the opportunities for disaster
risk reduction, building resilience, and enables us to un-
derstand the progression of vulnerability.
One unsafe condition detected in Chaitén was the
‘erosion of trust in authorities’. This facet can be linked
to decision-making and policies (dynamic pressures) and
political centralising forces (root causes) as applied by
temporally and spatially distant actors: ONEMI in Santi-
ago, the Presidential Delegate, parliamentary members,
among others. We know that a lack of ‘trust’ can nega-
tively shape vulnerability (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003)
by altering evacuation strategies as well as by diminish-
ing the effect of compensatory and recovery policies. Sev-
eral of the testimonies collected during interviews and
focal groups pointed towards one ubiquitous idea: in an
eventual volcanic eruption, Chaitén’s people will not fol-
low authorities’ instructions and it will likewise be diffi-
cult for them to ‘believe’ again in what authorities say.
In other words, Chaitén’s people may react negatively
to the idea to ‘evacuate’ the city again in the future
should they be called to. Upon review, it is possible to
link the arguments from local leaders and Chaitén peo-
ple and the ‘erosion of trust in authorities’ to multiple
particular and specific situations which solely involved
national and regional authorities: the ‘misunderstanding’
concerning the existence of a volcano in the area by the
authorities, further specific ‘negligence’ concerning early
andwrongly conclusions on the ‘tremors’ before volcano
eruption; the unplanned evacuation that produced the
splitting up of families and the lack of coordination be-
tween regional and local authorities; ineffective recovery
process which includes poor subsidies’ spending supervi-
sion; decision-making on the inhabitability of North and
South sectors in Chaitén; the abandonment of the New
Chaitén project after two years of planning, ‘spending’,
and consulting efforts; and the creation of the ‘parallel’
authority in the Presidential Delegate which bypassed lo-
cal and regional authorities.
A multi-scalar perspective on these aforementioned
situations tells us that these are indeed nested in major
processes or underlying causes. For instance, the evac-
uation of Chaitén in 2008 followed a distinct pattern of
‘life preservation’. ‘Life preservation’ as a rule of thumb
is found recurrently in theONEMI’s documents consulted
on emergency management and its prevalence makes it
appear as if other elements of evacuations are not im-
portant, such as the ‘supervision of the aid provided’ and
the ‘right to information’. This idea, as directed from the
ONEMI national office downwards to local authorities
and practitioners, may explain the reaction of authori-
ties during the period of evacuation: both the lack of
preparation in the destinations of evacuees and the sub-
sequent splitting up of families that occurred. This also
reveals a second and perhaps more crucial aspect, the
centralised model of DRM in Chile. Most of the recovery
strategy was planned and ‘imposed’ by national authori-
ties, substantially affecting the way in which local people
perceive state support during emergencies and recovery.
This is not negative per se because people are not passive
receivers of support, but considering Chaitén was a city
exposed to a rapid onset volcanic hazard and was eco-
nomically dependent on the state, it seems that the state
plays a major role in promoting disaster risk reduction
and resilience. The case of post-disaster Chaitén seems
to point to the insufficiency in the dominant narrative
which emphasises ‘life preservation’ as the sole indicator
for successful evacuations. Rather, when evacuation, re-
covery and reconstruction measures are not adequately
planned it can in fact help to produce other unsafe condi-
tions (i.e. mistrust) that ‘increase’ vulnerability and risks.
In stating this we are not trying to engage in a discussion
about ‘life preservation’ during emergencies in particu-
lar, but rather we wish to point out that dominant nar-
ratives are not as comprehensive as DRM needs to be,
and when these are embedded in a centralised model of
DRM as Chile, they may negatively impact people’s vul-
nerability in the future.
Here, it is important to note that disaster vulnerabil-
ity does indeed materialise in the form of ‘unsafe condi-
tions’ within specific social groups and spaces, but dur-
ing its progression disaster governance—i.e. the multi-
plicity of actors, rules, and processes related to DRM at
different geographical and social scales—its takes on an
even greater significance. Macro processes such as pol-
icy response, decision-making, centralisation, and insti-
tutional bodies for DRM and DRR are not directly ‘unsafe
conditions’ but rather the ‘root causes’ and ‘dynamic
pressures’ which then facilitate the production and pro-
gression of vulnerability.
Within this paper, we took the discourse on disaster
governance as a point of departure with the hope that
other forms of polycentric-, adaptive-, bottom-up- and
sundry-forms of governance may prevent the growth of
vulnerability and risks, and stimulate the debate around
this so that more optimal formats can be sought out.
We argue that societies are everything but static, lin-
ear functioning, homogeneous systems but are rather
highly complex, adaptive, dynamic and nonlinear devel-
oping spheres with a very heterogeneous population.
This snapshot of complexity is then compounded by the
history that comes with it. We believe that our concep-
tion of disaster governance can only be as good as the
basic notions of these sociocultural, historic conditions
are understood and the governance practices are ac-
cordingly adapted to this specific situation in space and
time. There is no ‘one-fits-all’ approach for disaster gov-
ernance. Rather, there is in fact the need to historicise
and contextualise governance practices to reduce the oc-
currence and, if nevertheless unavoidable, the outcome
of disasters.
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